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Abstract
Do the different approaches automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)
take to working relations with their suppliers affect economic variables that impact bottom
line results? This study is focused on exploring this question through four hypotheses:
1. Cooperative-trusting relationships lead to reduced costs of sourced
materials and overhead.
2. Cooperative-trusting relationships lead to increased levels of innovation
with a lower investment in research and development.
3. Cooperative-trusting relationships lead to improved product quality.
4. Cooperative-trusting relationships lead to better resource management of
inventory.
Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) was used to perform regression analyses on panel
series data. All four hypotheses were proven to a statistical significance of at least 0.10.
These results provide the empirical data necessary to substantiate the anecdotal evidence that
cooperative-trusting supplier relationships provide economic value. The working
relationships automotive OEMs have with their suppliers affect economic variables that
impact bottom line results and competitive advantage.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
Introduction
Do the different approaches automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)
take to working relations with their suppliers affect economic variables that impact bottom
line results? There are substantial differences between the supplier relations approaches
taken by the different Automotive OEMs. There is a range of supplier relations approaches
with extremes on both the adversarial and cooperative-trusting sides. Adversarial
approaches are typically characterized by a lack of trust, communication, cooperation,
equality, or some combination of these (Dyer 2000; Stallkamp 2005a). Conversely,
cooperative-trusting approaches generally have open and transparent lines of communication
and close collaboration; are predictable, consistent, and fair; and involve relevant parties
working jointly as a single team with shared responsibility and accountability (Winter 2004;
Stallkamp 2005a).
There are widely divergent views as to whether cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier
relations are worth the effort to develop and maintain versus more adversarial approaches.
Academic literature and the trade press substantiate the efficacy of cooperative efforts, as
there are many published articles pronouncing the benefits of cooperative relations in the
working environment. Some of the benefits of a cooperative approach include cost savings
for all parties, less complex and costly procurement negotiations and administration, shorter
product development cycle times with greater innovation, increased flexibility, enhanced
quality, and even next-generational competitive advantage (Clark 1989; Noordeweir, John et
al. 1990; Helper and Sako 1995; Dyer 1997; Dyer and Chu 1997; Sheth and Sharma 1997;
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Hacker 1999; Pecaut and Gordon 1999; Vonderembse 2002; Liker and Choi 2004; Segil
2004; Stallkamp 2005a).
Despite the abundance of anecdotal evidence and some related studies, many
manufacturers are not convinced, and they argue that more adversarial approaches yield
greater benefits with far less effort. Such skepticism is well founded. In fact, there is a lack
of both economic metrics and empirical evidence to substantiate the assertion that
cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relationships leads to bottom-line economic results worth
the investment (Liker and Choi 2004). Despite the anecdotal advantages, an empirical
analysis of supplier working relations is necessary to demonstrate the economic implications
and substantiate the benefits. The purpose of this study is to provide the quantitative analysis
of the value of cooperative-trusting relations for automotive OEMs.

Problem Statement
Due to the scarcity of statistically significant data linking OEM-supplier relations to
hard economic benefits, firms cannot select a relationship approach based upon the potential
returns. This situation can lead to firms selecting suboptimal supplier relation approaches
due to the lack of knowledge. The effects of supplier relation approaches and the
implications for a firm’s competitive advantage likewise cannot be fully appreciated without
an empirical study on the effects of supplier working relations with OEMs.
Without measuring the economic value of supplier relations, firms are unable to
accurately justify an appropriate supplier relation approach. Until supplier relation
approaches can be compared with relevant and related metrics, an economically driven
argument cannot be made for employing cooperative and trusting supplier relation efforts.
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The significance of this argument is exacerbated by the growing importance of suppliers in
OEM competitiveness.
Market trends have transformed the automotive industry from vertically integrated
hierarchies to integrated networks of suppliers providing larger and more complex
production components and services. Supplier relation strategies have likewise evolved, but
measurements of the potential benefits of the approaches are not available. In many cases,
OEM approaches to supplier relations have not evolved to match the market’s shift. The
dissemination of increasingly larger responsibilities to suppliers has created a need for OEMs
to work with their suppliers to improve overall productivity, effectiveness, and efficiency
through cooperation (Dyer 2000).
In fact, many scholars now argue that competition in industry has changed from
company versus company to supply chain versus supply chain (Fine 1998; Dyer 2000; Rice
and Hoppe 2001; Vonderembse 2002; Zhang, Dong et al. 2003; Liker and Choi 2004; NdedeAmadi 2004). Indeed, suppliers typically provide goods and services that account for 50 to
70 percent of an OEM’s total expenses to produce an end product (Dyer 2000; Tangri 2004).
Supplier management has become more important due to this trend (Kim and Michell 1999)
and has spurred considerable research into improving supply chain management. Despite the
emphasis on supply chain management, most of the research has been focused on analytical
approaches, while the area requiring the most work is in managing supplier relationships
(Handfield 2004b).
Rather than analyzing individual characteristics such as trust or communication
between suppliers and OEMs independently, a more accurate and realistic approach is to
analyze the full range of supplier working relations. The range of trusting cooperative
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relations as measured by Planning Perspectives Inc. Working Relations Index (WRI) (Henke
1990; Liker 2004; Liker and Choi 2004; Flynn 2005; Stallkamp 2005a) includes five
components focusing on Relationships, Hindrance, Communication, Help, and Profit
Opportunity, each of which are composed of variables that help to quantify the OEMsupplier working relation.
The WRI measures the quality of the overall OEM-supplier working relations,
ranging from adversarial to cooperative and trusting. Using the WRI as a proxy for the
quality of OEM-supplier working relations, an analysis of the effect of supplier working
relations can measure the impact of the various supplier relation approaches of the
automotive OEMs. The relative WRI scores for 2000-2004 are displayed in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. WRI results representing years 2000-2004, courtesy of Planning Perspectives Inc.

Hypotheses
The benefits expected from a cooperative-trusting approach to supplier working
relations are in the areas of cost, product development and innovation, quality, and flexibility
in resource utilization. To explore these expected benefits, this study is focused on four main
hypotheses. The hypotheses are
1. Cooperative-trusting relationships align trading partners in a system cost
reduction approach, which leads to reduced costs of direct sourced
materials and lower overhead costs managing suppliers.
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2. Cooperative-trusting relationships leverage supplier relationships and
investments, which leads to increased levels of innovation with a lower
overall investment in research and development.
3. Cooperative-trusting relationships foster collaboration and an emphasis on
end product quality, which leads to improved product quality.
4. Cooperative-trusting relationships enhance coordination between trading

parties, which leads to better resource management of inventory.
This study recognizes that the approach OEMs take to their trading partners affects
more than just these hypothesized areas. However, it is outside the scope of this study to
address the less quantitative effects of relationships.

Purpose of the Study
The objective of this study is to provide a quantitative assessment of the economic
value of cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relations in the automotive industry. In
achieving the objective, the study will meet the following goals:
•

Determine the relationship of economic variables with characteristics of
cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relations;

•

Develop metrics that relate economic benefits to specific OEM-supplier
relationship characteristics;

•

Describe the potential mechanisms by which OEM-supplier relations
create economic value; and

•

Determine the degree to which economic benefits are gained or lost as the
characteristics of cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relationships change.
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Justification and Significance
In meeting this purpose, the study will provide multiple significant benefits for both
industry and government, including the following:
•

Understanding of the implications of manufacturer relations approaches on
related economic variables when working with suppliers;

•

Justification for resource allocation to create and maintain cooperative and
trusting OEM-supplier relations; and

•

Direction for improving specific areas of OEM-supplier relations and
supply chain management activities to maximize the opportunity for
economic gain under conditions of cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier
relations.

The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on the economic value of assets, in
which the relationship approach an OEM selects is considered an asset. The basic theory of
assets indicates that a rational economic actor (the OEM) would be willing to pay/spend
anything up to the discounted present value of the stream of net benefits that it would
generate. In the case of this thesis, the benefits are derived in the four hypotheses. With
more cooperative-trusting relations, OEMs will benefit with lower costs, higher innovation
with lower investments, better quality, and enhanced inventory/resource management.
When considering which approach to buy, OEMs would consider the relative cost to
benefit ratios of the various approaches. OEMs can assess the relative benefits of approaches
by starting at a completely adversarial approach and incrementally evaluating the marginal
benefit gained as the approach becomes more cooperative-trusting. The present value of
each approach must be evaluated as well. Since the expected benefits of cooperative-trusting
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relationships include both short and long term benefits, the present value needs to be
estimated with a discount rate and risk premium (since the future benefits of relationships are
probabilistic, not guaranteed). As a rational economic actor, an OEM would select the mixed
approach that provides the maximum value over the estimated lifetime of the relationship.
This study builds on the theory of assets by providing a model for evaluating the
relative benefits of cooperative-trusting relationships between OEMs and suppliers. OEMs
can assess their current approach and the marginal benefits possible with alternative
approaches with an estimate of the value gained through cooperative-trusting relations.
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Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature

There is a distinct division between the supplier relations approaches taken by
domestic US automotive OEMs and Japanese Foreign Domestic OEMs (the North American
Japanese automotive OEMs Toyota, Honda, and Nissan). Numerous studies have addressed
the disparities between Domestic and Japanese automotive OEM approaches to relationships,
but few attempt to empirically demonstrate the benefits of cooperative and trusting OEMsupplier working relations (Dyer and Chu 1997). According to some, long-term, closely
linked relationships have performance advantages for automakers and their suppliers in both
the United States and Japan (Helper 1991; Helper and Sako 1995). Indeed, experts agree that
corporations should build close-knit networks of suppliers that work together to provide
value to both parties (Vonderembse 2002; Liker and Choi 2004).
Domestic US automotive OEMs (General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler) have
historically maintained adversarial relations with their suppliers, with few exceptions, since
the early 1900s (Asanuma 1989; Helper and Hochfelder 1995; Mudambi and Helper 1998;
Liker and Choi 2004; Flynn 2005). The short-term benefits of adversarial practices have
immediate and quantifiable results, which fuel their continued application. Long-term costs
are rarely a concern to Domestic OEMs because stockholders and management emphasize
current performance. For example, domestic automakers are about four times more
concerned with cost than quality, while Foreign Domestic OEMs are more balanced
(Webster 2003). Even though domestic firms have made attempts to build better superficial
supplier interactions, it has been largely unsuccessful, particularly in creating the
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fundamental elements of the relationships (Helper 1989; Helper and Sako 1995; Liker and
Choi 2004).
Indeed, a 1991 study of supplier relations with domestic and Foreign Domestic OEMs
indicated that suppliers are more than twice as likely to expect domestic OEMs to behave
opportunistically if given the chance, and other studies echo this notion (Dyer, Cho et al.
1996; Dyer 1996a; Kim and Michell 1999). Even the General Motors vice president for
Worldwide Purchasing, Production Control & Logistics, Bo Andersson, stated at the 2004
Auto-Tech conference that the relationship between GM and its suppliers is “occasionally
dysfunctional” (Murphy 2004).
Conversely, Japanese and Foreign Domestic OEMs (Japanese OEMs with major
operations in North America, i.e., Toyota, Honda and Nissan) traditionally have more
cooperative and trusting relationships with their suppliers (Mudambi and Helper 1998; Kim
and Michell 1999; Dyer 2000). Specifically, survey results indicate that Japanese OEMs are
better communicators, are more trustworthy, and are more concerned with the economic
viability of suppliers than domestic OEMs (Liker and Choi 2004). Similarly, a 2003 J.D.
Power and Associates study also found that suppliers believe that Japanese OEMs,
particularly Toyota and Honda, are adept at promoting innovation while domestic OEMs
were below average in their ability (Liker and Choi 2004). The dominance of the Japanese
OEMs in the recent market likewise seems to indicate that supplier relations may have a role
in their competitive advantage. In fact, a study has shown that cooperative and trusting
OEM-supplier relations will support technology sharing from suppliers, greater supplier
investments into new technology, and higher quality products with improved levels of
service (Szczesny 2004).
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Despite the qualitative research that has been done to date, both sides point to
conventional wisdom that supports their approach. Adversarial proponents have the
advantage of tangible, short-term results to assess the value of their approach. Cooperativetrusting advocates, however, have had to rely upon anecdotal evidence and possible
indicators to support their decisions. The literature reviewed presents the arguments of both
sides and serves as the foundation for this study.

Adversarial Relations
Adversarial approaches that organizations take with their suppliers are characterized
by a lack of trust, dedicated assets, communication, cooperation, equality, or some
combination of these (Dyer 2000; Stallkamp 2005a). Adversarial approaches typically look
to minimize dependence on suppliers, maximize bargaining power, and avoid commitment
(Kim and Michell 1999). Adversarial approaches typically result in adversarial relations that
are distinguished by arms-length interaction including, but not limited to, rigidly defined
product and process specifications, constricting legal contracts, little information sharing
(including production schedules), lack of trust, multi-sourcing with the intent of creating
intense competition, and short notice supplier changes for price advantages (Morris and Imrie
1992; Dyer 2000).
In many cases, adversarial relations are not explicitly chosen. Rather, organizations
tend to be driven towards adversarial relations by market factors, competition, incentives,
and basic business realities though there are exceptions (Flynn 2005). Typically, adversarial
relations are driven by four major business factors: distrust, poor communication, limited
planning, and constant vying for control (Stallkamp 2005a). These factors create friction
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between organizations that lead to inefficiencies, which add costs to business operations,
slow down responses to market changes, and create barriers to change and improvement.
Adversarial relations do not stop at direct suppliers. Indeed, adversarial practices that
are imposed upon OEM first tier suppliers are used against their second tier suppliers as well
(the first tier suppliers’ suppliers) (Kobe 2001, March). First tier suppliers tend to argue that
adversarial relations with their suppliers are adopted to meet the demands of their customers
(Flynn 2005). Typically these costs are just transferred to lower tier suppliers, sometimes
causing them to go out of business, and are not removed from the system (Segil 2004;
Hanley and De Koker 2005).
These adversarial approaches are not just theoretical; they are demonstrated by
several automotive OEMs, particularly the Domestic OEMs. Supplier surveys indicate that
domestic US automakers are often seen as abrasive in their price reduction efforts, not as
collaborative with product development matters, and less willing to share savings from cost
reduction efforts compared to more cooperative Japanese and Foreign Domestic OEMs. The
typical adversarial approach for automotive OEMs to reduce costs is to increase competition
to motivate existing suppliers to incrementally improve, force suppliers to reduce slack in
their operations, and to switch business to cheaper suppliers if available (Helper 1997). Ford
and General Motors have both used these adversarial approaches to compel suppliers’ price
reductions (Asanuma 1989).
As a result, suppliers indicate that they continue to provide more cooperative and
trusting automakers with higher quality parts, new technology, and cost-cutting strategies,
which may be contributing to the competitive advantage of Foreign Domestic OEMs
(Webster 2003). Indeed, suppliers’ willingness to share new technology with OEMs is
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impacted by the OEMs’ policies and approaches with suppliers. For example, a new policy
issued by Ford in January 2004, similar to a GM policy, states that with new contracts,
suppliers must allow the OEM to share auto-parts technologies with other firms in the Ford
group (WallStreetJournal 2004, August 24). With intellectual property rights so explicitly
endangered, suppliers may certainly be less willing to share their newest products with this
customer.
The value of adversarial relations. Adversarial relations, while slighting future
returns, do offer some immediate benefits. Adversarial OEMs have used market
dependencies to demand price reductions from suppliers, leveraging the oligopsonistic
market (market with multiple suppliers and a limited number of customers that tends to give
more power to the customers) that existed since the 1920s, in which few buyers were
available for multiple suppliers to sell their products to (For example, only one OEM has a
need for Explorer power trains). Suppliers competed viciously for OEM business and were
willing to actually take losses to maintain their business.
While some price reductions could be expected with scale economies and learning
curves, most adversarial OEM price reductions did not follow such models but were instead
arbitrary. OEMs have been known to demand immediate 5% price decreases from all
supplied parts or to pay suppliers only 95% of their invoices and mark them paid in full. For
example, General Motors used intense supplier competition and price reduction demands in
the early 1990s to generate a very tangible savings of around $4 billion (Kim and Michell
1999). The immediate returns are obvious, but the long-term costs are hidden.
In addition to immediate benefits, some OEMs assert that the cost of maintaining
adversarial relations is relatively low compared to trusting cooperative relations (Stallkamp
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2005b). This is half true since little to no effort is required to support minimal
communication and mistrust, which is a savings compared to communication-rich
cooperative relations. However, the cost avoided by maintaining minimal relations is not
entirely saved because of the large amount of effort expended reacting to problems that arise
because of poor communication. The costs of redesigning parts through Engineering Change
Notices (ECNs), late shipments, incorrect quantities, and poorly coordinated product
development are rather substantial and likely cost more than the savings from reduced
relationship maintenance.
However, the way OEMs have leveraged suppliers to force cost reductions may be
changing. The market dependencies have shifted with the growth of Foreign Domestic
OEMs, and suppliers have begun to exercise their options by pursuing business with more
cooperative customers (Parker 2003). Indeed, there is a trend that bilateral OEM-supplier
power is shifting more to suppliers, creating a more balanced environment in which suppliers
are not forced to accept OEM mandates (Flynn 2005). As one supplier executive puts it
“We’re not a charity, we’re a business. And we understand [OEM] issues, but [the OEMs]
have to understand [the suppliers’]. We have to be profitable or we can’t put capital in this
business.” This attitude is becoming more common as suppliers are now able to pick and
choose their customers for their limited capacity.
The costs of adversarial relations. Adversarial relations are short-term oriented to
increase competition and enable OEMs to switch suppliers to a supplier with lower piece
prices (Flynn 2005). However, switching suppliers is expensive and risky and can endanger
supplier investments in R&D and tooling (Sherefkin 2003). Another cost associated with
changing suppliers through adversarial actions is the replacement costs of finding and
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training new suppliers, particularly in instances where suppliers are highly customized to
specific, complex business such as automotive parts (Segil 2004). There can be additional
costs to changing sources that aren’t easily tracked, including unknowns such as quality and
the cost of poor quality, component overall fit into end product, warranty costs, problem
resolution timeliness, flexibility, and engineering support to name a few.
Adversarial relations are exacerbated and sustained by short-term transaction-oriented
attitudes. In these cases, immediate price reductions are rewarded internally, while long-term
investments are typically viewed as unfavorable versus more immediate returns. Short-term
oriented approaches may come from the way OEMs measure their objectives. Procurement
areas are measured by how much they spend and how much they are able to reduce their
piece part prices.
The immediate gains from adversarial actions are often made by sacrificing future
costs in the way of warranties, product development, tooling, and capital equipment with
suppliers (Stallkamp 2005a). Many of these costs are not only incurred by the OEMs, but
suppliers too are negatively impacted by short-term approaches. Indeed, many automotive
suppliers have gone out of business due to a lack of profitability, partly caused by OEM price
reduction mandates (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. Timeline of North American supplier bankruptcies.
The effect of the short-term orientation is to create an environment in which suppliers
have no opportunity to recover their investments because their contracts are subject to
cancellation with little recourse. For example, General Motors instated a contracting clause
that gives suppliers 30 days to match a rival’s lowest price, or else GM can terminate their
business with no liability. If this approach continues into the long run, automakers could
experience a decrease in vehicle quality as they lose their innovative and high-quality
suppliers and are left with less experienced suppliers that only offer lower piece prices
(Parker 2003).
Suppliers play a major role providing goods and services that help create an
organization’s competitive advantage. However, if suppliers are focusing their efforts
strictly on reducing piece price, their decisions may negatively impact other areas of business
performance such as quality or innovation (Vonderembse 2002). Similarly, suppliers treated
with adversarial relations are unwilling to invest in customer specific technologies and
equipment because adversarial OEMs typically reserve the right to transfer production to the
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lowest cost supplier on short notice (Appleby and Twigg 1988; Morris and Imrie 1992;
Helper 1997).
Adversarial relations are marked by poor communication and a lack of coordination,
which typically lead to late and unplanned engineering changes. These late and unplanned
engineering changes can impact not only suppliers’ costs but also, to a greater extent, the
costs of the OEM. Indeed, these changes lead to costs for slowed production and excess
work and rework for expediting logistics and material handling (Pecaut and Gordon 1999).
A lack of trust can exacerbate information-sharing problems, as suppliers are generally
unwilling to share important information if they do not trust the OEM to work cooperatively
with them (Dyer and Chu 1997).
The use of arbitrary price reduction demands is a prevalent and destructive form of
adversarial relationships. In the automotive industry, uncooperative OEMs typically prefer
to generate quick savings by demanding that suppliers reduce the price of their products by a
specified amount (Sherefkin 2003). These price cuts are rarely directed towards reducing
actual supplier costs or system costs; rather, they reduce supplier margins. The system costs
remain, and they will reappear deeper in the supply chain and eventually work their way back
up to the OEM. The price reductions demanded by domestic OEMs have historically been
used to help control their own costs (Parker 2003). In addition to demanding larger price
reductions, domestic OEMs typically leave it up to their suppliers to absorb the reductions,
whereas Foreign Domestics generally assist in their suppliers’ improvement efforts
(Cleveland 2004).
The practice of arbitrarily reducing prices not only eats into supplier margins,
sometimes making products unprofitable, but it also rewards suppliers that are not the most
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trustworthy. For example, suppliers that give their best price to OEMs are punished for
doing so when they are required to further reduce prices, making the business unprofitable.
To remain viable, these suppliers look for ways to make up for the lost revenue. However,
suppliers that inflate prices are able to absorb cost reductions without impacting their bottom
line. This creates the cycle of suppliers inflating prices, and OEMs demanding price
reductions, with the more dependent side on the short end.
It has even been reported that suppliers providing a component to domestic OEMs
costs the supplier eight (8) percent more on average than supplying a similar part for Toyota
or Honda. Some potential causes of these higher costs include higher administrative costs
from extra meetings, more paperwork, and unnecessary negotiations and haggling
(AutomotiveNews 2005). Particularly, the impact to transaction costs can be decomposed
into four costs of transacting: Search Costs, Monitoring Costs, Contracting Costs, and
Enforcement Costs (Dyer and Chu 1997). Lorenz also indicates that transaction costs are
directly linked to the possibility that partners will behave opportunistically (Lorenz 1988).
Indeed, suppliers indicate that much of their time and money is wasted with writing
exceptions to domestic OEM terms and conditions that are subject to change at any time
(Kobe 2001, March). For example, historic contracts from domestic OEMs ranged from 2430 pages, while Toyota and Honda have purchase agreements of essentially terms and
conditions that are only 8-10 pages long.

Cooperative Relations
Cooperative and trusting relations are relationships that have open and transparent
lines of communication and close collaboration, are predictable, consistent, fair, and involve
relevant parties working jointly as a single team with shared responsibility and accountability
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(Winter 2004; Stallkamp 2005a). Trusting and cooperative relationships are not soft, cozy, or
touchy-feely relationships in which partners are allowed to take advantage of each other.
Instead, trusting and cooperative relationships are typically more demanding and more
disciplined than adversarial relationships. The objective of fostering cooperative and trusting
relations with suppliers is to create a cohesive supply chain where all partners understand
how their participation contributes to the end goal (Vonderembse 2002).
One hypothesis is that cooperative relationships will have strong elements of trust to
offset vulnerability and dependability, while adversarial relationships will be lacking trust
due to the reliance on formal regulations (Mudambi and Helper 1998). Trust between OEMs
and suppliers is the foundation of effective cooperative relations (Poirier 1999). Indeed, all
relationship-building activities are founded on trust, and supply partnerships are held together
by trust (Fawcett and Williams 2001).
Many equate the Toyota and Honda approaches to supplier relations as exemplary of
cooperative and trusting relations, and even traditional North American suppliers prefer to do
business with them over domestic OEMs (Winter 2004). Indeed, Japanese automaker
performance is attributed in part to their long-term relationships with suppliers, high levels of
information exchange, joint problem solving, and “governance by trust” (Dertouzos, Lester et
al. 1989; Smitka 1991; Cleveland 2004). An analysis of the partnering model employed by
Honda and Toyota revealed that although different actions are taken, there is a common
foundation underpinning the relationships. The underlying steps to the Japanese approach to
cooperative and trusting supplier relationships are (Liker and Choi 2004)
•

“Understand how the supplier works;

•

Transform competition into opportunity;
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•

Supervise suppliers;

•

Develop supplier capabilities;

•

Share relevant information intensively; and

•

Improve operations together.” (107-108)

The Japanese procurement approach is generally based on long-term strategic
partnerships rather than the short-term contracting, which has been typical of the U.S.
automotive industry (Smitka 1990). A study (Wasti and Liker 1997) found that the average
length of the relationship between suppliers and buyers in the Japanese automotive
component industry was 22 years. Even though the long-term relationships reduce leverage
with suppliers, Japanese OEMs are able to achieve greater efficiency through their consistent
relations (Helper 1990). The OEMs maintained competition between 2-4 suppliers, but
provided each with enough business to maintain their economic viability (Sheth and Sharma
1997). Generally, these relations are more likely to avoid making demands that would
negatively impact supplier economic viability (Flynn 2005). This approach is taken to make
sure that suppliers are profitable enough to invest in future technologies and improve
performance while maintaining an environment with motivation to innovate (Kobe 2001,
March; AutomotiveNews 2005).
Despite the Japanese reputation for superior supplier relations, domestic OEMs have
also been able to develop strong cooperative and trusting relations with suppliers. Perhaps
the paramount example of effective domestic relations was demonstrated by Chrysler during
their Supplier Cost Reduction Effort (SCORE), in which the characteristics of a collaborative
relation were in place with suppliers (Kobe 2001, March). Between 1991 when first
introduced and 1998, Chrysler leveraged supplier suggestions to reduce costs by $5 billion
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just through SCORE alone. However, one of the surprising advantages was that suppliers
were able to improve their profit margins and devote more of their internal funds to
advancing Chrysler-specific products and processes that further increased enterprise
efficiency (Dyer 1996b). Indeed, any savings generated by suppliers were split in half
between the OEM and suppliers, so there was a definite incentive for suppliers to find these
opportunities. Suppliers were trusted to share their savings equitably, and that trust spoke
volumes to suppliers that were typically accustomed to being audited by OEMs, an
adversarial and untrusting approach (Stallkamp 2005b).
Unlike traditional cost reduction programs, Chrysler engaged suppliers as peers and
used their intimate knowledge of their parts to reduce costs equitably and fairly. The
improvements realized by SCORE were not just immediate savings but were permanent and
improved operations year after year. Another noticeable savings was that suppliers accepted
increased responsibility for design, which reduced Chrysler costs for product development
while increasing the rate of innovation. In 2000, Chrysler had the lowest percentage of sales
dedicated to research and development for new products, while their time to market for new
introductions improved (Stallkamp 2005a).
The value of cooperative relations. Cooperative and trusting supplier relations are
reported by many to provide a competitive advantage by providing substantial economic
value. Studies into components of trusting and cooperative supplier-buyer relationships
indicate that trusting relationships reduce transaction costs and increase information sharing
between parties (Dyer 1997). Additional findings suggest that not only are the benefits
present, but they are substantial as well; in some cases transaction cost differences exceeded
a magnitude of five times the cost (Dyer and Chu 1997). These findings tend to indicate that
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trust in supplier working relations with their customers reduces the amount of time spent in
unnecessary haggling and blame games, as well as other time-consuming activities that add
no value to operations. Additionally, suppliers tend to invest more of their own resources
and dedicate better employees to their better customers that reward supplier efforts (Flynn
2005). The longer-term relationships provided by cooperative and trusting relations enable
suppliers to invest in their specific relationship with the OEM with more confidence (Morris
and Imrie 1992).
Close collaboration is particularly critical during early new product development
when concepts begin to take shape into designs. The early involvement of suppliers during
product development has been demonstrated to provide a competitive advantage to Japanese
automakers in introducing new products faster and with less effort than domestic OEMs
(Clark 1989). For example, Japanese firms such as Toyota or Honda need only 12-18
months to design a new vehicle, where as domestic OEMs typically require 2-3 years (Liker
and Choi 2004).
Chrysler has also leveraged supplier capabilities in product development to save costs
while developing the Plymouth Prowler. The frame development work-sharing benefited
both organizations; Chrysler saved five million dollars in research and development costs,
and Alcoa gained additional business by showcasing their new technologies to other
customers such as Audi (Stallkamp 2005b).
Indeed, the benefits of supplier relationships are valued so much by Japanese OEMs
that neither Honda nor Toyota purchases very much from China for the wage savings,
preferring instead the innovation capabilities of their long-term suppliers (Liker and Choi
2004). In fact, a study conducted by Vantage Partners shows that nearly 80 percent of
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respondents to a survey said that strong working relationships with suppliers generated 25
percent or more quantitative value (Segil 2004).
Likewise, there are many benefits suppliers can realize from working with OEMs in
collaborative and trusting working relations. Some potential benefits suppliers may realize
include a guaranteed source of continued business, assistance in developing technology and
tooling, purchasing leverage for high volume raw material purchases, managerial and
technical assistance, and shared learning and improvement between the parties (Morris and
Imrie 1992). Also, suppliers that perform more research and development for OEMs are
typically rewarded with a greater portion of final production contracts than other suppliers
previously, partially because of concerns for process control, integrated purchasing, and
quality assurance (Rawlinson 1990).
The development of cooperative and trusting supplier relationships and commitment
are demonstrated to be associated with one another, thus creating a mutually causal
relationship (Dyer and Chu 1997; Mudambi and Helper 1998). This relation suggests that
once cooperative-trusting supplier relations are created, they will be self-sustaining with
potential multiplier effects. Further, it has been found that investments made to create and
sustain cooperative and trusting relations simultaneously create economic value within the
relationship (Dyer and Chu 1997). Indeed, a study by Pecaut and Gordon indicates that when
supplier relationships are managed with demanding yet cooperative-trusting relations (“tough
love”), there is generally an 8-10% one-time savings in total supply chain costs and a 3-5%
savings each year beyond that (Pecaut and Gordon 1999). Given these associations between
cooperative-trusting relationships’ ability to self-sustain and provide economic value, firms
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that develop cooperative-trusting relations with partners will reap continual economic
benefits.
While many support the belief that cooperative and trusting supplier relations provide
many benefits, the benefits are generally gained incrementally over time, often lagging
implementation of cooperative efforts (Dyer 2000; Vonderembse 2002; Flynn 2005). The
time lag can make it difficult to distinguish the benefits from supplier relations from other
factors. These confounding factors make it difficult for OEMs and suppliers to discern
whether their cooperative-trusting supplier relations are truly providing economic value.
The costs of cooperative relations. The approaches that typically foster cooperativetrusting supplier relations tend to require investments by both OEMs and suppliers to
maintain. Particularly, investments to achieve the high levels of information flow necessary
to support many of the cooperative and trusting relationship activities can be considerable.
Additionally, OEMs and suppliers that invest in cooperative and trusting relations with their
partners greatly increase the cost of switching and thus increase their dependence upon their
selected partners (Helper and Levine 1992; Helper 1997; Kobe 2001, March). Both OEMs
and suppliers are concerned that once they make investments in relationships, their partners
may behave opportunistically to take advantage of their increased dependence. Indeed, the
domestic OEMs have experiences in which suppliers have taken advantage of trusting
relations to underperform or overcharge (Flynn 2005).
Suppliers are likewise concerned with potential costs of investing in cooperativetrusting relations. An element of trusting and cooperative supplier relations is for suppliers
to share their cost structures more openly with their partners. In the short-term, this open
sharing could reduce a supplier’s profit margins while reducing system costs. However, in
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the long-term, what was lost in piece price reduction and lower profit margins is made up in
additional orders and a more competitive structure to garner more business with other buyers.
In addition to increased business, suppliers and OEMs can reduce the amount of time trying
to conceal information and creating false reasons for high costs or price reductions (Pecaut
and Gordon 1999).

Relationship Approach Selection
Relationships with suppliers are not one-size-fits-all; relationships should be based
upon the type of product supplied and the strategic fit of the supplier within the supply chain.
It would be cost prohibitive and unnecessary to form close partnerships with all suppliers
(Dyer 2000). Similarly, it would be inappropriate to treat strategic suppliers that are critical
to competitive advantage as if they were commodity suppliers (Dyer, Cho et al. 1996;
Vonderembse 2002). However, there are no cut and dry classifications for all suppliers.
According to the Boston Consulting Group, approximately 50-70% of automotive product
suppliers are neither strategic nor commodity suppliers to OEMs but are rather a middle
group between the extremes (Pecaut and Gordon 1999).
The approach to supplier relationships can impact the costs present within a supply
chain. An adversarial approach has an overreliance on attacking and removing variable costs
(piece price) that ignores system level costs such as warranties, engineering costs, and
research and development (Stallkamp 2005b). Cooperative and trusting supplier relations,
however, tend to focus on technical advancements and system costs outside the variable cost
of component prices (Helper 1990; Stallkamp 2005b).

25

In general, the relative benefits of cooperative-trusting relationships are dependent
upon the type of industry and type of supplier. Four characteristics of suppliers that likely
impact the benefits garnered are
1. The relative complexity of the system being created and the complexity of
the components supplied,
2. The amount of engineering support required for the product supplied,
3. The quality requirements for the product, and the relative cost of poor
quality, and
4. The necessary level for the reliability of supply for that component.
As these factors become more important to an OEM, the relative benefits of
cooperative-trusting relationships increases. In essence, the technical interdependence with
suppliers is a good indicator for the need for cooperation and trust. This is not to say that
commodity suppliers are throwaway; their relationships still require some level of quality and
reliability of supply.
Indeed, there can be too little and too much trust in relationships, where the potential
benefits are not realized or the costs can outweigh the benefits and expose themselves too
much (Hacker 1999). Extensive communication systems necessary to support cooperative
relations can be costly to establish and maintain with multiple suppliers (Helper 1990).
Additionally, the exchange of proprietary information can be extremely harmful to a firm’s
competitive advantage if inappropriately distributed by suppliers or OEMs.
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Fluctuations in Relationship Approaches
Many procurement organizations tend to alternate between adversarial and
cooperative relationships (Pecaut and Gordon 1999). Suppliers to domestic OEMs were
typically managed with an adversarial approach to the point of the supplier going bankrupt,
and only then would the OEM assist the supplier in turning a profit. According to the expresident of the Chrysler group, Thomas Stallkamp, “The system was so screwed up, it was
like going out and shooting people until they started bleeding to death, and then put them on
intensive care and help them to get better.” (Stallkamp 2005b)
Large firms have substantially reduced their number of suppliers, and in some cases
suppliers become exclusive with a customer (Sheth and Sharma 1997). The exclusive
relationship can increase supplier dependency with a high percentage of output going to a
single buyer (Handfield 2004a). OEMs with a cooperative-trusting approach to supplier
relationships may use increased dependency to integrate suppliers into new products and
daily operations. However, in an adversarial OEM-supplier relationship, the dominant party
(OEM) typically applies their economic leverage to dictate concessions without regard for
the well-being and economic viability of the subordinate firm. This relation drives a shortterm focus that emphasizes immediate gains while ignoring sustainable future growth
(Stallkamp 2005a).
Domestic automakers have attempted to create the superficial practices of cooperative
and trusting supplier relations; however, they have not successfully created the underlying
relationship foundation that makes Japanese OEMs successful in their approach (Helper
1989; Helper and Sako 1995; Liker and Choi 2004). However, one true example of a
domestic OEM pursuing a cooperative and trusting approach was the Chrysler’s Extended
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Enterprise approach, lauded as one of the most successful supplier involvement programs in
the automotive industry (Stallkamp 2005a). Nominally similar though fundamentally
different, Ford attempted a superficially cooperative approach to reducing supplier prices
called Team Value Management, which focused on collaboration among purchasing, design,
manufacturing, and suppliers. The objective of the Ford effort was to create more “open and
transparent relationships with suppliers” (Parker 2003, 3), including supplier input on
purchasing decisions. However, the effect of the Ford program did not noticeably impact
supplier perceptions of cooperative spirit.
In contrast, the Japanese automotive industry developed the fundamentals of
cooperative-trusting supplier relations over time through strategic alliances and cooperative
supplier relations (Smitka 1990). This approach may have been chosen in part to gain the
higher quality and lower cost of components associated with long-term supplier relationships
versus internal production (Nishiguchi 1994). However, it is apparent that the Japanese
Foreign Domestic OEMs took a long-term approach to developing the fundamentals of
cooperative-trusting supplier relations. The long-term approach used seems to have garnered
a more stable foundation to build closer and more efficient business practices with suppliers.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

This study builds on the work of Planning Perspectives Inc. (PPI). Over the past 12
years, PPI has tracked a variety of characteristics associated with cooperative-trusting
supplier relations across more than 50 companies in four manufacturing sectors. PPI has
quantified 17 of these characteristics into the Working Relation Index (WRI). The WRI
provides a reliable, widely accepted metric for measuring manufacturer-supplier working
relations (Liker 2004; Liker and Choi 2004; Flynn 2005; Stallkamp 2005a).
The WRI includes five components focusing on Relationships, Hindrance,
Communication, Help, and Profit Opportunity. Communication indicates the extent to which
OEM communication is open and honest; Help defines the amount of manufacturer help
provided to suppliers in meeting buyer price and quality demands; Hindrance denotes the
degree of manufacturer hindrance that impedes the suppliers' ability to do the best possible
job in providing products to the manufacturer; and Profit Opportunity represents the supplier
profit opportunity with each buyer.
The WRI characteristics, along with related manufacturer-supplier relationship data
that PPI has collected, provide the foundation upon which the project is based. The PPI
database is unique in both its breadth and depth of relationship-related measures and
subsequently provides a strong foundation for determining the economic value of
manufacturer-supplier relationships. This study consists of six basic steps. The general
research steps follow.
1. Identify manufacturer-supplier behavioral characteristics that contribute to
building cooperative-trusting working relations;
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2. Identify the economic benefits that are or could be realized by the
involved parties;
3. Identify metrics to quantify the behavioral characteristics and the
economic benefits of a cooperative-trusting working relationship;
4. Collect and analyze market data on the economic metrics associated with a
cooperative-trusting working relationship;
5. Cross-analyze economic metrics with cooperative-trusting relationship
characteristics and attributes to determine correlations and importance;
and
6. Report findings.

Dependent Variable Selection
The dependent variables are the measures used to evaluate the relative benefits of
cooperative-trusting supplier relationships. These variables were selected as the most
accurate metrics representative of the four hypotheses of this study. The metrics selected to
support the hypotheses were
1. Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) – COGS represents all the costs that go into
sourcing, producing, and selling the end product. COGS is an aggregate
representation of costs that includes the costs of supplier interactions.
Strategic sourcing and supplier relationship improvement initiatives are
related with the Cost of Goods Sold, one of a manufacturer’s highest
bottom line costs (Vonderembse 2002; Tangri 2004). While COGS is an
aggregate of total OEM costs, it is expected that the benefits of
cooperative-trusting relationships will be large enough to discern from this

30

variable. This metric is the dependent variable for the first hypothesis:
cooperative relations reduce costs.
2. Cadence – Cadence is the volume-weighted pace of launches of
completely new and significantly redesigned vehicle models from an
OEM. The Prudential Equity Group has measured cadence over a
considerable time frame and has validated the applicability of this metric.
Cadence is the best contiguous measure of OEM innovation that is readily
accessible. This metric was selected to represent an OEM’s relative rate
of innovation. New products now account for a greater percentage of
most companies’ revenue due to the rapid change in end-customer
demands. Shifting design responsibility from OEMs to suppliers improves
the productivity of product design by leveraging the supplier expertise to
reduce development time and lower overall costs (Vonderembse 2002;
Liker and Choi 2004). This metric, along with research and development,
supports the second hypothesis: cooperative relations increase innovation
per dollar.
3. Research and Development (R&D) – R&D is the amount of capital an
OEM invests in its own internal research programs to develop new
products and innovations. This measure best represents the amount of
effort an OEM spends on creating new products. This metric, along with
cadence, supports the second hypothesis: cooperative relations increase
innovation per dollar.
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4. Quality Problem Index – The Quality Problem Index is an adaptation of
the J. D. Powers and Associates (JDPA) Initial Quality Study (IQS). The
IQS is a model-level study. It measures 135 attributes across nine
categories, including ride/handling/braking, engine and transmission, and
a broad range of quality problems symptoms reported by vehicle owners
90 days after ownership. JDPA is considered an authority in tracking
automotive end vehicle quality, and their initial quality study most likely
provides the most accurate measure of contiguous end product quality.
End product quality is due in large part to the materials provided by
suppliers and the overall fit of supplier parts into the end system. More
cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relationships have demonstrated
improvements in product quality (Dyer 1997; Vonderembse 2002). This
metric is the dependent variable for the third hypothesis: cooperative
relations foster end product quality.
5. Inventory – Inventory is a measure of the total inventory an OEM carries.
Studies have demonstrated that more cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier
relationships garner performance improvements in resource utilization
(Lieberman, Helper et al. 1998; Vonderembse 2002). This metric, along
with inventory turns, supports the fourth hypothesis: cooperative relations
improve material management.
6.

Inventory Turns – Inventory turns is the fraction of a year that an average
item remains in inventory. Low inventory turns is a sign of inefficiency,
since inventory has no return on investment (i.e., cost of capital). This
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metric is a measure of an OEM’s material management efficiency and its
ability to leverage supplier relationships to improve material usage.
Studies substantiate that longer-term and information rich relationships
indicative of cooperative-trusting relationships enjoy better inventory
utilization rates (Lieberman, Helper et al. 1998). This metric, along with
inventory, supports the fourth hypothesis: cooperative relations improve
material management.

Data Collection and Formatting
Data were collected from a variety of sources. The main sources of data were
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database; Planning Perspectives, Inc., Working Relations
Index database; J. D. Powers and Associates database; Prudential Equity Group, LLC,
database; and Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
All economic data including sales, cost of goods sold, inventory, inventory turns, and
research and development investments were taken from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat
database. Once these data were extracted, nominal dollar values were converted into real
dollars using the CPI methodology provided by the Research Department of the Minnesota
House of Representatives (Dalton, Novak et al. 1998) (Fig. 3). CPI data were gathered from
the St. Louis Federal Reserve website for Calendar Years 1998-2004.
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Fig. 3. CPI methodology for changing to real dollars.

J. D. Powers and Associates provided data from their Initial Quality Study that
measures 135 attributes across nine categories, including ride/handling/braking, engine and
transmission, and a broad range of quality problems symptoms reported by vehicle owners.
The surveys were administered to purchasers and lessees of new model year vehicles 90 days
after ownership. The index was generated for the 6 OEMs studied and is based on the
relative quality of the OEMs in comparison to each other.
Planning Perspectives, Inc., provided data for the Working Relations Index (WRI).
WRI data were provided for the 6 OEMs being studied: Ford, General Motors,
DaimlerChrysler, Nissan, Toyota, and Honda. Data covered Calendar Years 2002-2005, and
Trust data were provided for the years 2001-2005. At the direction of Planning Perspectives,
Inc., estimates of 2001 WRI data were made using the available Trust and WRI data.
Planning Perspectives, Inc., likewise advised that Calendar Year data represented the
previous year’s actions and should be used to represent the previous year. With this
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information, the 2001-2005 WRI data were used to represent Calendar Years 2000-2004
relationships.
Prudential Equity Group, LLC, provided data from their Cadence report (Bruynesteyn
2005). Cadence is a calculated by dividing the total estimated production volume of new
models and redesigned vehicles for a given year by the OEM’s sales forecast. Cadence was
used for Calendar Years 2000-2004 for the 6 OEMs studied: Ford, General Motors,
DaimlerChrysler, Nissan, Toyota, and Honda.

Supplemental Interviews
To supplement the literature reviewed, interviews were conducted with representative
academicians, industry experts, supplier executives, and OEM personnel. The interviews
collected tacit knowledge that was not covered in publications.
Academicians within the field of automotive OEM-supplier interactions were
interviewed to better understand the concepts and theories that surround the dynamics of
relationships. Interviews were conducted with professors from five (5) major universities.
Industry experts who are well known and respected in the automotive industry were
interviewed for their broad knowledge on the subject of OEM-supplier relationships and their
evolution. Interviews were conducted with representatives of four (4) major automotive
industry analysis organizations.
Supplier interviews were focused on the experiences with OEM relationship
approaches and the relative responses and actions. Sales and purchasing executives from five
(5) top tier-one suppliers were interviewed to collect their experiences with different OEMs
relationships.
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OEM interviews were conducted to gain an understanding of the approaches OEMs
explicitly and implicitly take towards supplier relationships. Purchasing executives and
agents were interviewed to determine what the strategies were for supplier relationships and
what the day-to-day activities were that formed the overall relationship with suppliers.
Interviews were conducted with representatives from three (3) major OEMs.

Data Analysis Methodology
Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) was used to perform all regression analysis of
data. Regression analysis was the main methodology of data analysis, using the “Proc Reg”
command in the SAS program. This is a unique data set since the Working Relations Index
(WRI) and the Trust Index, calculated by Planning Perspectives Inc., exist only for the years
2001-2005. In order to estimate the relationships over time, given the limited time series,
panel data were constructed using the five (5) available years of data for the six (6) OEMs
studied, yielding a total of 30 observations for all analyses. While the number of
observations was not ideal, it was limited in the amount of data available. However, pooling
of the data presented enough observations and degrees of freedom to determine statistical
significance.
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data

Hypothesis 1: Cooperative Relations Reduce Costs
Cost of goods sold (COGS) is the measure of expenses a company incurs to
manufacture and sell a product, including the price of raw materials and components as well
as the cost of manufacturing a product. The largest component of COGS in the automotive
industry, approximately 50 to 70 percent or more, comes from supplier-provided goods and
services (Dyer 2000; Tangri 2004). The first hypothesis of this study is that more
cooperative-trusting relationships, as measured by the WRI, have a lower cost of doing
business with suppliers as measured by COGS. The hypothesis likewise indicates that as
relationships become more cooperative and trusting, costs will decrease.
The estimates were as follows:
cogs = 6075.82 + 0.75 sales(-1)*** – 42.62 WRI* + 18501 df***
(1.00)

(20.62)

(-1.93)

(9.21)

- 1553.42 dc + 811.56 dn + 7318.46 dt + 2334.98 dh
(-0.69)

(0.12)

(1.18)

(0.30)

[Where: *** = statistically significant at 0.01
** = statistically significant at 0.05
* = statistically significant at 0.10]
Adjusted R2 = 0.996
cogs = real cost of goods sold
sales(-1) = real annual sales lagged by 1 year
WRI = Working Relations Index measure of relationship
df = dummy variable for Ford specific effects
dc = dummy variable for Chrysler specific effects
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dn = dummy variable for Nissan specific effects
dt = dummy variable for Toyota specific effects
dh = dummy variable for Honda specific effects
This model indicates that more cooperative and trusting relations do have lower
reported COGS. This result implies that for each point of the WRI that an organization
scores, their COGS are generally $42.6 million lower. This model confirms the hypothesis
that OEMs with cooperative-trusting relations with suppliers have lower COGS.
The other significant results of this model are that real sales were positively related
with COGS and the firm specific effect of a single OEM. These results are not surprising, as
COGS is typically dependent on sales and is, in fact, roughly ¾ of sales costs, which is
consistent with this model. The firm specific effect indicates that Ford Motor Company’s
COGS are generally higher than General Motors’. However, we can ignore these results
since we are primarily interested in the results associated with the effects of the WRI score.
In addition to this model, a second model was used to explore the elasticity of the
effect of relationships on COGS. To measure the elasticity, a double log model was used.
The estimates were as follows:
ln cogs = 3.27** + 0.48 ln cogs (-1)* – 0.24 ln WRI* – 0.08 d1**
(2.39)

(1.86)

(-1.93)

(-2.49)

– 0.11 d2*** – 0.10 d3*** – 0.05 d4** + 0.02 df + 0.01 dc – 0.23 dn
(-4.89)

(-4.06)

(-2.28)

(1.01)

(-0.22)

(-1.48)

+ 0.01 dt – 0.18 dh
(0.17)

(-1.16)
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Adjusted R2 = 0.987
ln cogs = logarithm of the real cost of good sold
ln cogs(-1) = logarithm of the real cost of goods sold lagged by 1 year
ln WRI = logarithm of the Working Relations Index
d1 = dummy variable for the first calendar year, 2000
d2 = dummy variable for the second calendar year, 2001
d3 = dummy variable for the third calendar year, 2002
d4 = dummy variable for the fourth calendar year, 2003
The results of this model indicate that as relationships between OEMs and suppliers
increase by 1 percent, their COGS will decrease by 0.24 percent. The other significant
results are that COGS decreased for all OEMs each year from 2000-2004, which is consistent
with the recent economic recessions and OEM efforts to reduce costs.
These models confirm the hypothesis that OEMs with more cooperative-trusting
relationships with their suppliers will have a lower cost of doing business with their suppliers
and thus a lower COGS. Further, OEMs that increase the cooperativeness and
trustworthiness of their supplier relations reduce their COGS. These results support the
assertions of Lorenz and Segil (Lorenz 1988; Segil 2004) that higher costs result when
partners are expected to behave opportunistically, a characteristic of adversarial relations.
Pecaut and Gordon and an Automotive News article (Pecaut and Gordon 1999;
AutomotiveNews 2005) were not far off the mark when they indicated that suppliers
providing a component to OEMs with adversarial relations increased costs 3-8 percent more
on average, compared to cooperative-trusting relations. In fact, according to this model using
data from 2000-2004, the OEMs studied pay on average between 2-10 percent more in
COGS annually than what they would if they attained the same level of WRI as their more
cooperative competitors.
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A graph of 5 years of COGS data can help to visualize the relative trends of COGS
versus WRI for the OEMs studied. Figure 4 displays the trends of COGS as a ratio of sales
for the 6 OEMs studied. Definite increasing trends are present for Ford and General Motors,
while Chrysler, Nissan, and Honda have decreasing COGS ratios. This is consistent with the
study findings, since Ford and GM have decreasing WRI scores, while Chrysler, Nissan, and
Honda all have increasing WRI scores over this time period.
OEM COGS Ratio
Ford

1.00

General Motors
Chrysler

0.90

Nissan
Toyota
Honda

0.80
COGS

Linear (Ford)
Linear (General Motors)

0.70

Linear (Chrysler)
Linear (Nissan)
Linear (Toyota)

0.60

Linear (Honda)

0.50
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Year

Fig. 4. OEM COGS trend from 2000-2004.
Contrasting the OEM WRI percentage (scores on a scale of 0 to 500) to their COGS
ratios with sales, the negative relationship between WRI and COGS can easily be seen (Fig.
5). As WRI decreases, the COGS measure increases. Conversely, as WRI increases, COGS
decreases.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of OEM WRI percentages and COGS ratios.
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Hypothesis 2: Cooperative Relations Increase Innovation Per Dollar
Innovation is an important aspect of an automotive OEMs competitive advantage.
Customers demand the latest and greatest at an affordable price. Fresher products brought to
market faster are believed to lead to market strength, earnings, and share price. One measure
used in the automotive industry to assess an OEM’s relative innovation level is called
Cadence (Bruynesteyn 2005). Cadence is a measure monitored by Michael Bruynesteyn at
the Prudential Equity Group, LLC. Cadence is defined as the “volume-weighted pace of
launches of completely new and significantly redesigned vehicle models.” Simply put, it is a
measure of the new models that typically “generate hype and excitement for an automaker,
tend to sell well with minimal incentives, increase showroom traffic, and lead to increased
sales of other models, as well as boost market share and ultimately affect profits and the
share price.” (Bruynesteyn 2005)
Achieving a high cadence, however, must be balanced with the level of investment an
OEM places into research and development (R&D) programs. If the amount of money
invested outweighs the benefits of high cadence, competitive advantage is lost. Striking this
balance between investment and outcome is the topic of the second hypothesis. Cooperativetrusting OEMs are expected to have higher cadence and lower R&D because they tend to
work with suppliers to bring their innovations into products faster, and suppliers tend to trust
these OEMs with their intellectual property (Liker and Choi 2004; Szczesny 2004). To test
this assertion, the second hypothesis is that cooperative-trusting OEMs as measured by the
WRI have higher levels of innovation (as measured by cadence) and a relatively lower
amount of resources invested into R&D.
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The estimates were as follows:
cadence = 0.13417** – 0.34385 cadence(-1)** + 0.00044045 WRI*
(2.27)

(-2.04)

(1.92)

Adjusted R2 = 0.130
cadence = index of OEM innovation and new product development
cadence(-1) = index of OEM innovation and new product development lagged 1 year
This model indicates that more cooperative and trusting relations do have higher
cadence levels. This result implies that for each point of the WRI that an organization scores,
their cadence is generally 0.00044045% higher. This model confirms the hypothesis that
OEMs with cooperative-trusting relations with suppliers have higher cadence levels.
The other significant result is that cadence is negatively related to the previous year’s
cadence. This is consistent with the fact that high cadence levels place strains on resources,
which can constrain near term investments for the following year’s innovation
improvements. However, this model is mainly concerned with the effect of the WRI
measure, so the additional results can be ignored.
To further test this hypothesis, a model is necessary to measure the level of R&D
investments an OEM makes. This model is used to see if cadence is impacted by R&D
investment levels or by the OEM-supplier relationship approach used. To determine the
marginal effect of relationships on R&D investment, a model was developed to investigate
the elasticity of the effect of the WRI on R&D investments. To measure elasticity, the
logarithms of the dependent variable and independent variables were modeled.
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The estimates were as follows:
ln rd = 3.70090* + 0.28811 ln sales – 0.60614 ln WRI*** - 0.11636 d1***
(1.98)

(0.85)

(-3.94)

(-3.11)

- 0.14405 d2*** - 0.12034 d3*** - 0.07231 d4** + 0.11711 df***
(-5.31)

(-3.50)

(-2.47)

(4.42)

+ 0.09226 dc** - 0.11485 dn + 0.17783 dt* + 0.09076 dh
(2.71)

(-0.63)

(2.06)

(0.52)

Adjusted R2 = 0.9658
ln rd = logarithm of real research and development investments
ln sales = logarithm of real sales
The results of this model indicate that as WRI relationships between OEMs and
suppliers increases by 1%, OEM R&D investments will decrease by 0.61%. Other
significant results are annual effects and firm specific effects. Annual effects indicate that
R&D investments decreased for all OEMs in each year from 2000-2004, which is consistent
with the recent economic recessions and OEM efforts to reduce costs. Firm specific results
echo the previous model’s results that other OEMs annually invest relatively more than
General Motors does. The effects of the WRI measure on R&D investment is of primary
concern here, so the additional results can be ignored.
These results support the notion that close collaboration between OEMs and suppliers
leads to faster introduction of new products with less effort (Clark 1989; Flynn 2005;
Stallkamp 2005a). The combined results of this study’s models demonstrate that OEMs with
more cooperative-trusting supplier relations as measured by WRI do indeed have better
cadence innovation with lower R&D investment costs. According to Prudential Equity
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Group, firms are able to derive a competitive advantage from higher cadence as demonstrated
by the figure below (Fig. 6). When high cadence levels are coupled with lower R&D
investments, OEMs can achieve an even greater advantage in the market.

Fig. 6. Effect of cadence on market share (courtesy of Prudential Equity Group, LLC).
Interpreting these results, adversarial OEMs with lower WRI scores have lower levels
of innovation and relatively higher R&D investments. This indicates that adversarial OEMs
do not successfully leverage supplier innovation and end up spending more on R&D without
considerable innovation in return. This may be due to the lack of perceived trustworthiness
by suppliers, or the inability of suppliers to invest in future technologies due to a lack of
profitability with adversarial OEMs (Kobe 2001, March; Vonderembse 2002;
AutomotiveNews 2005).
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Hypothesis 3: Cooperative Relations Foster End Product Quality
End product quality is a measure taken from J. D. Powers and Associates’ (JDPA)
Initial Quality Study (IQS) that measures overall product quality 90 days after ownership.
The higher the index number, the more problems encountered and thus the lower an OEM’s
end product quality relative to the other OEMs studied. End product quality is due in large
part to the materials provided by suppliers and the overall fit of supplier parts into the end
system. Cooperative-trusting relationships with suppliers should improve product quality
due to improved communications, mutual concern, and a greater dedication to the end
product (Dyer 1997; Vonderembse 2002; Webster 2003; Szczesny 2004; Stallkamp 2005b).
The third hypothesis of this study is that more cooperative-trusting relationships as
measured by the WRI have a lower score on the JDPA quality problem index (i.e., higher
quality). The hypothesis likewise indicates that as relationships become more cooperative
and trusting, the quality problem index will decrease (i.e., quality will improve).
The estimates were as follows:
quality = 1.37*** - 0.0000018 profit(-1) – 0.0013 WRI*** - 0.11 d1**
(13.49)

(-1.15)

(-5.96)

(-2.31)

- 0.09 d2* - 0.06 d3 - 0.03 d4
(-1.84)

(-1.21) (-0.63)

Adjusted R2 = 0.5720
quality = index for overall product quality
profit(-1) = real annual profit lagged one year
This model indicates that more cooperative and trusting relations do have better end
product quality as measured by the JDPA IQS. This result implies that for each point of the
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WRI that an organization scores, their quality problem index will improve by 0.0013.
Considering that WRI scores can differ by hundreds of points, the impact on quality can be
significant on OEM competitive advantage. This model confirms the hypothesis that OEMs
with cooperative-trusting relations with suppliers have better end product quality.
The other significant results of this model are from annual effects. The annual effects
indicate that in years 2000 and 2001, quality was better than other years by roughly 9-11
percent. These effects may be demonstrating the higher quality of components purchased in
that timeframe versus the lower price components purchased from developing countries later
in the 2000s. However, we can ignore these results since we are primarily interested in the
results associated with the effects of the WRI score.
In addition to this model, a second model was used to explore the elasticity of the
effect of relationships on quality. To measure the elasticity, the logarithms of the dependent
variable and independent variables were taken.
The estimates were as follows:
ln quality = -0.27 + 0.13 ln sales* – 0.20 ln WRI* + 0.04 df**
(-0.55) (1.81)

(-2.00)

(2.56)

+ 0.04 dc** + 0.10 dn** – 0.03 dt + 0.06 dh
(2.27)

(2.36)

(-0.88)

(1.28)

Adjusted R2 = 0.8519
ln quality = logarithm of index for overall product quality
The results of this model indicate that as relationships between OEMs and suppliers
increases by 1 percent, their quality problem index will decrease by 0.20 percent. The
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elasticity demonstrates that as relationships improve, higher quality is fostered in the
interactions of the OEM and suppliers. The result of cooperative efforts seems to bring the
trading partners closer together and increase the emphasis on quality, similar to what studies
have found for Japanese Foreign Domestic OEMs (Webster 2003).
The other significant results are for the logarithm of sales and firm specific effects.
The positive relationship between the logarithms of sales and quality is likely because as the
volume of sales increases, quality decreases to meet the increase in demand. The firm
specific effects indicate that Ford, DaimlerChrysler, and Nissan all experience higher quality
problem scores than GM during the study period. However, since the emphasis of the model
was to determine the effects of the WRI on quality, we can ignore these additional results.
These models confirm the hypothesis that OEMs with more cooperative-trusting
relationships with their suppliers will foster an environment of quality that will lead to higher
quality end products. Further, OEMs that increase the cooperativeness and trustworthiness of
their supplier relations will continue to improve their relative quality. These findings support
the assertions of Dyer and Vonderembse (Dyer 1997; Vonderembse 2002).

Hypothesis 4: Cooperative Relations Improve Material Management
Total inventory and inventory turns are two measures of how effectively and
efficiently an organization manages its resources. The more capital that is tied up in
inventory means the less capital that is available for other actions, such as growth and
innovation, not to mention the cost of capital. Organizations that are able to operate with
lower inventories and higher inventory turns are better able to utilize capital and save costs.
Long-term and information-rich relationships between suppliers and OEMs have
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demonstrated performance improvements in inventory utilization (Lieberman, Helper et al.
1998). The fourth hypothesis of this study is that cooperative-trusting OEMs, as measured
by the WRI, are able to more effectively manage their resources by leveraging their
relationships with suppliers to reduce their own internal inventory levels and increase
inventory turns.
The estimates were as follows:
inventory = 5235.29 + 0.18 sales(-1)** - 61.29 WRI*** - 3534.93 d1*
(0.39)

(2.73)

(-4.28)

(-1.80)

- 5833.81 d2*** - 2913.75 d3 - 160.88 d4 – 13942 df*** - 955.91 dc
(-3.78)

(-1.63)

(0.12)

(-9.01)

(-0.46)

+ 8882.31 dn + 6792.01 dt + 13368 dh
(1.04)

(1.32)

(1.59)

Adjusted R2 = 0.9530
inventory = real total inventory levels
This model indicates that OEMs with higher levels of WRI do have lower reported
total inventory levels. This result implies that for each point of measured WRI that an
organization scores, their inventory is generally $61.3 million lower. This effect seems to be
a moderating effect versus lagged sales, which reduces the impact of larger sales volumes on
inventory levels. This model confirms the hypothesis that OEMs with cooperative-trusting
relationships with suppliers have lower inventory levels.
The other significant results of this model are associated with lagged sales, annual
effects, and a single firm specific effect. The previous year’s sales were positively related
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with inventory, which is to be expected since resource planning typically uses historical sales
data. Annual effects demonstrate decreases in inventory levels each year from 2000-2004,
which is consistent with economic recession and Just-In-Time and lean practices focused on
inventory reduction that OEMs applied during those years. The single significant firm
specific effect is lower inventory levels for Ford Motor Company, possibly due to their
extreme adoption of Just-In-Time inventory practices, slashing their inventory levels.
However, the purpose of this model is to measure the effect of WRI on inventory levels, so
the additional results can be disregarded.
Inventory turns is a measure of an organization’s ability to cycle through their stock
of materials, with higher turns generally associated with lower inventory levels. To evaluate
the effect of OEM-supplier relationships on inventory turns, a model was created to measure
the impact of the WRI on OEM inventory turns.
The estimates were as follows:
inventory turns = -5.49 + 0.000029 sales + 0.028 WRI*** + 2.71 d1**
(-1.01)

(1.13)

(3.23)

(2.50)

+ 2.84 d2** + 2.44 d3** + 0.95 d4 + 12.62 df*** + 0.55 dc + 2.53 dn
(2.36)

(2.31)

(1.15)

(14.83)

(0.57)

(0.64)

+ 1.73 dt – 0.22 dh
(0.62)

(-0.05)

Adjusted R2 = 0.9449
inventory turns = number of inventory turns per year (number of times inventory
cycled through)
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This model indicates that higher OEM WRI scores do have higher reported inventory
turn rates. This result implies that for each point of measured WRI that an organization
scores, their inventory turn rate is generally 0.028 turns higher each year. Considering that
WRI scores range in the hundreds, this can have a substantial impact on OEM inventory turn
rates. This effect supports the results of the model for inventory levels. This model confirms
the hypothesis that OEMs with trusting relationships with suppliers have higher inventory
turn rates.
The model returned other significant results for annual effects and firm specific
effects. Each year from 2000-2003 has an associated positive effect on overall inventory turn
rate for all OEMs, ranging from 2.44 to 2.84 turns increases each year. These results
coincide with industry efforts to reduce inventory levels and increase inventory turns. The
single firm effect is for Ford Motor Company, and has a considerable positive effect that
indicates Ford’s turn rate is higher than average. This effect is consistent with Ford’s
aggressive implementation of Just-In-Time inventory policies and previous programs (i.e.,
Nirvana). However, the emphasis of this model is to determine the effects of WRI on
inventory turns, so these extra results can be ignored.
These models confirm the hypothesis that OEMs with more cooperative-trusting
relationships with their suppliers generally have lower inventory levels and higher inventory
turns than adversarial OEMs. Inventory levels and turn rates may be better for cooperativetrusting OEMs because they are able to work with their suppliers better in coordinating the
supply of parts, and suppliers are able to trust OEM forecasts and production schedules
(Lieberman, Helper et al. 1998). The flow of information is critical to the usage of resources,
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particularly when inventory levels are low as with the automotive industry’s use of Just-InTime practices. Also, cooperative-trusting OEMs have a greater reliability of supply from
their suppliers, which reduces the amount of inventory insulation necessary to protect against
disruption.
Contrasting the OEM WRI percentage (scores on a scale of 0 to 500) to their
inventory ratios with sales, the negative relationship between WRI and inventory is apparent
(Fig. 7). As WRI decreases, inventory levels increase. Conversely, as WRI increases,
inventory levels decrease.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of OEM inventory ratio and WRI percentage.
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A graph of 5 years of inventory data can help to visualize the relative trends of
inventory turn rates versus WRI for the OEMs studied. Fig. 8 displays the trends of
inventory turn rates for the 6 OEMs studied. Definite decreasing trends are present for Ford
and General Motors, and to a lesser degree Chrysler, while Nissan’s turn rates are noticeably
increasing and Toyota and Honda stay relatively stable. This is consistent with the study
findings, since Ford and GM have decreasing WRI scores, while Chrysler’s scores are
marginally increasing, and Nissan’s WRI scores dramatically increased in this time period.
Toyota and Honda inventory turns likely remained stable, with a little improvement due to
their long-term approach. Their relationships are already developed, and they seem to be in
more of a maintenance phase. Since their relationship is in maintenance, improvements are
likely not as dramatic, though they are still present. This suggests a logarithmic scale of
improvement, where the higher scores are, the more they have to improve to see noticeable
benefits.
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Fig. 8. OEM inventory turn rate trends from 2000-2004.
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Inventory levels and inventory turn rates seem to be directly related to the level of
working relationships between OEMs and suppliers. Adversarial OEMs tend to be less
forthcoming with their forecasts, which results in higher inventory levels throughout the
supply chain (e.g., the Pontiac Aztek). Cooperative-trusting OEMs generally work with
suppliers and can achieve a leaner approach to inventory usage, leveraging supplier resources
and efforts.
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Chapter 5: Discussion

This study has determined the relationship of specified economic and performance
related variables with characteristics of cooperative-trusting supplier OEM-supplier
relationships. Metrics were developed to represent and relate the benefits of cooperativetrusting relationships to specific activities. The results of the analyses indicate that the
anecdotal evidence in favor of cooperative-trusting relationships is substantiated. Each
hypothesis was proven statistically significant. These results lay the foundation for the
comparative analysis of relationship approaches for OEMs.
Despite the strong results of the analyses, there remains some discussion on why the
benefits are achieved and how cooperative-trusting environments are created. This section
will use the literature reviewed, interviews conducted, and data analyzed to discuss some
possible explanations. Specifically, this section will postulate some of the mechanisms for
how benefits are achieved, the barriers to fostering cooperative-trusting relations, and
potential ways to overcome barriers. Finally, this section develops a game theory concept
termed Supplier’s Dilemma, which is constructed upon the prisoner’s dilemma theory.

Mechanisms of Cooperative Supplier Relations
Cooperative-trusting relations are developed over time through a series of
mechanisms ranging from major changes in corporate philosophy to the implementation of
tactical tools. The characteristics of cooperative-trusting relations are sustained by
mechanisms that support the overall approach, and the success of such an approach is
affected by the combination of mechanisms in place. Some of the apparent mechanisms that
were considered in this study are listed below.
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Trust – Trust is a central component of cooperative-trusting supplier relationships.
Developing a sense of trust and trustworthiness is necessary for both OEMs and suppliers.
Developing trust appears to evolve over time with consistent, reliable, and equitable actions
(Helper and Sako 1995). When trust between suppliers and OEMs develops, Maister, Green,
et al. indicate that it is generally driven by four basic steps: Credibility – a common
understanding on which to base the relationship; Reliability – dependability, consistency, and
predictability; Intimacy – understanding each other’s feelings, emotions, and dealing with
each other in a genuinely caring perspective; and Lack of Self-Orientation – commitment to
the concerns, needs, and behaviors of the other parties in the supply chain (Maister, Green et
al. 2000). Despite the steps towards creating trust, it is apparent that it is something that
develops slowly over time and is quickly lost with opportunistic actions.
Information Sharing – The flow of relevant information through regular communication is
critical to developing and maintaining cooperative-trusting supplier relations. Effective
communication of requirements with appropriate safeguards helps align partners’ efforts to
avoid duplication of effort and reduce system costs (Handfield 2004a). Information helps
OEMs ensure that their component designs are compatible with suppliers’ processes and
equipment, thus improving system productivity and quality (Helper and Sako 1995).
Dedicated Assets – When the powerful partner (the OEM) has a short-term approach to
relationships, supplier assets that are dedicated to that customer becomes a liability.
However, a long-term OEM approach turns dedicated asset into a positive influence
(Handfield 2004b). Suppliers that are able to invest in dedicated assets will be more
productive and increase the system’s efficiency. When suppliers are unable to invest in asset
specificity, the overall system’s productivity goes down.
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Competition – Relationships can stifle themselves when partners do not maintain a
competitive spirit (Anderson and Jap 2005). A detailed picture of suppliers’ capabilities and
cost structures maintains competitive tension that stimulates innovation and progress (Pecaut
and Gordon 1999). It’s been demonstrated that competitive tension helps partners to
continuously improve and identify opportunities to reduce waste, improve processes and
product design, and decrease costs (Strauss 1999). However, hyper-competition and the
threat of bankruptcy turn competition into a liability that reduces the willingness of parties to
invest in relationships. A balance of competition and consistency provides the benefits of
rivalry and creates an environment conducive to optimizing the system. Elements of
competition are also included in the Contract Negotiations mechanism.
Contract Negotiations – Frequently evaluating supplier contracts not only maintains
competition with suppliers, but it also prevents a relationship from growing stale and
complacent (Pecaut and Gordon 1999; Anderson and Jap 2005). However, a supplier should
be in a position to believe that there is a high probability of continued business with an OEM
for more than 3 years (Helper and Sako 1995). While renegotiating contracts enables buyers
to switch suppliers if better opportunities arise, the essence of trusting and cooperative
relations is to work with the current supplier to help them reach their goals with sufficient
resources (Helper and Sako 1995). The penalties for not achieving these goals should not
rest solely upon the supplier but should also be an incentive for the buyer to help. The longterm nature of cooperative-trusting contracts also reduces supplier uncertainty, which allows
suppliers to make specific investments with their customers (Lorenz 1988; Vonderembse
2002). Through these activities, competition is maintained while the benefits of long-term
relationships are gained.
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Contract Maintenance – Partnerships reduce the contracting effort between manufacturers
and suppliers and allow for more open exchanges of information (Vonderembse 2002). More
flexible contracts allow relationships to grow, as opposed to writing constricting legal
requirements that can stifle the development of partnerships and cooperation.
Product Design – Involving suppliers in product design enables OEMs to leverage supplier
knowledge and enhance learning. These benefits create better solutions that can improve
supply chain efficiency, improve quality, and increase performance before designs lock
system costs into the product manufacturing (Vonderembse 2002). Indeed, once a product
reaches final design, roughly eighty percent of the product costs are determined and more or
less set for the life of the production (Tangri 2004). The system cost avoidance possible
during product design requires the early collaboration of suppliers with collaborative trusting
relations.

Barriers to Cooperative-trusting Relationships
If cooperative-trusting relationships were more beneficial than adversarial
relationships (even anecdotally), why would OEMs choose to remain adversarial?
Adversarial relationships, while typically not explicitly chosen (Flynn 2005), are the result of
policies that are rigorously selected. Even though adversarial relationships are not chosen
per se, several tier-1 supplier executives agree that “adversarial OEMs know about the
problems, but they just don’t care.” However, OEMs have made strides to become more
cooperative-trusting in their OEM-supplier approach. The difference between supplier
perspective and OEM efforts suggests that there are barriers to the adoption of truly
cooperative-trusting relations.
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Two of the main barriers that are present in today’s environment are based on the
need for short-term results and the metrics used to track performance (both for suppliers and
OEM buyers).
The need for tangible and immediate returns stems from stockholder expectations and
prevents OEMs from “doing what’s right for their future.” A 5 percent decrease in price
today is easy to see and touch, while cooperative relations that result in more innovative
products in 3 years are harder to measure. The tendency of adversarial OEMs to shortchange
the future for immediate returns is a barrier to building a cooperative-trusting relationship
with suppliers. Suppliers tend to shy away from adversarial customers when possible.
Suppliers cite an inability to get fair returns on their investments and technology as major
barriers.
Also, adversarial actions are easier to resort to when there are financial problems,
such as the ones the domestic automotive industry is facing today. The benefits of
cooperative-trusting supplier relationships are also not guaranteed but are more associated
with a probability. This shortsightedness leads suppliers to believe that adversarial OEMs
are not as interested in removing system costs but are more interested in immediate price
reductions.
The second barrier is the set of metrics used to measure buyer and supplier
performance. OEM buyers are typically measured on piece price reductions, not on longterm relationships, innovation, or cost avoidance. By not tracking the soft costs, OEMs are
directing their buyers to look only at immediate piece price reductions that fail to reduce
system costs. These short-term objectives make it difficult for OEMs to really pursue
positive relationships. Performance should be the backbone of OEM-supplier relationships,
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but if performance is measured with short-term gains, cooperative relationships will be
difficult to develop.
One analogy that Simon Nagata, vice president of purchasing for Toyota North
America, used to describe the difference between adversarial and cooperative-trusting
relationships is the difference between hunter/gatherers and modern farmers (Winter 2004).
The analogy describes how some OEMs carefully nurture and cultivate their suppliers for
sustained value, like a cooperative-trusting farmer. Conversely, some OEMs treat suppliers
as if they were going to be hunted down and become lunch; those are the adversarial
hunter/gatherers. Brett Smith from the Center for Automotive Research suggests that OEMs
shift from the predatory practices of hunters (adversarial) to a cultivating approach
(cooperative-trusting) for developing suppliers (Vashilash 2005).

Overcoming Barriers: Personal and Corporate Relations
Overcoming the barriers of adversarial relationships is a challenge that typically must
be initiated by the OEMs. Once OEMs start toward cooperative-trusting relationships,
suppliers must support the efforts to change the environment. To really signify the change,
OEMs should lead with action and not just words. Building trust with key suppliers is a
long-term proposition, and it is not going to happen overnight. Sourcing suppliers early in
the life of a product is one action supplier executives mentioned would be a sign of
cooperation, as long as the components weren’t market tested thereafter. This action requires
both parties’ trust and commitment, which begins to build mutual trustworthiness.
One of the questions regarding development of cooperative-trusting supplier
relationships deals with how they are created, that is, whether they are developed through
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personal interactions or produced by a corporate culture. Supplier executives seem to agree
that elements of both are necessary for truly successful relationships. An adversarial culture
can be overridden by strong connections between people. Some suppliers had their most
adversarial and most cooperative experiences with the same OEM. One supplier executive
responded, “You’re able to trust the person, even if you cannot trust the system.” However,
these personal relationships are more difficult to form if the corporate culture is adversarial in
nature.
Corporate culture, however, seems to be a predecessor of cooperative-trusting
relationships. Adversarial actions, such as rotating buyers through commodities and banning
social interactions with suppliers (i.e., lunches, etc.), tend to restrict the ability to create
personal relationships. Conversely, a culture of cooperation works to increase the individual
relationship through interaction and teamwork. Establishing strong leadership that advocates
cooperative-trusting approaches to OEM-supplier relationships seems to be essential to
developing a cooperative approach. With strong leadership in place, the metrics used to
measure performance can be changed to better support the development of cooperativetrusting relations.
According to Liker and Choi (Liker and Choi 2004), Toyota and Honda used similar
foundational practices to develop their cooperative-trusting supplier relations. Their study
identifies six activities central to both OEMs’ approaches. These activities closely relate to
the findings of other studies and the results of the interviews conducted for this study. The
steps are as follows:
1. First, the OEMs need to work with suppliers to better understand how they
work and what the barriers are between them.
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2. Second, OEMs need to create opportunities for innovation and
improvement, essentially an environment for continuous improvement.
Typically cooperative-trusting firms carefully use controlled competition
to balance rivalry with consistency.
3. Third, OEMs must be trustworthy and must trust suppliers but maintain
some level of insight for verification. Performance is the foundation of
this step, and careful attention should be paid to defining and measuring
appropriate metrics.
4. Fourth, OEMs should use their own resources to help develop suppliers’
technical capabilities. In the current market, it is supply chain versus
supply chain; OEMs should invest in making the entire system more
effective and efficient.
5. Fifth, communication with suppliers should be frequent and selective.
Information overload can have the same negative effect as too little
information. Communications should be made concisely for specific
purposes.
6. Sixth, OEMs should cooperate with suppliers for continuous
improvement.
Figure 9, an adaptation from Liker and Choi’s publication (Liker and Choi 2004),
illustrates the development of foundational practices and the hierarchy of supplier partnering.
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Fig. 9. Supplier partnering hierarchy courtesy of Jeff Liker (Liker and Choi 2004).

Supplier’s Dilemma
The choice between adversarial and cooperative-trusting relations shares a gametheory structure closely related to the prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the two
players in the game can choose between two approaches, either cooperative or adversarial.
The idea is that each player gains when both cooperate, but if only one of them cooperates,
the other one, who is adversarial, will gain more at the cost of the other. If both are
adversarial, both lose (or gain very little) but not as much as is lost by the cooperator whose
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cooperation is not returned. The whole game situation and its different outcomes can be
summarized by a table (Table 1) in which hypothetical points are given as an example of how
the differences in result might be quantified.
The interactions of the OEM-supplier relationship approaches appear to be very
similar to those in the prisoner’s dilemma. Adversarial OEM-supplier relationship
approaches lead to a situation in which every inch gained by one organization is an inch
given up by the other. The zero-sum game begins when suppliers are forced to arbitrarily
reduce their prices for an OEM (or other adversarial actions). The natural response for
suppliers is to respond by finding other ways to recoup their losses, such as charging higher
prices for problem-solving services or future engineering changes (Stallkamp 2005b). In
time, suppliers will expect to be forced to reduce costs and will find more creative ways to
recapture their losses and remain profitable. This game is easily iterated down the tiers of
suppliers as well. These interactions are something that could be termed the Supplier’s
Dilemma.
The zero-sum game played by OEMs and suppliers with adversarial relationship
approaches has been occurring with domestic OEMs for some time. However, when OEMs
and suppliers approach their relations with cooperative-trusting relations, both parties are
better off in the end. A postulated table of outcomes is provided in Table 1.
Table 1
Supplier’s Dilemma Table of Outcomes
Payoffs are (OEM, Supplier)

Supplier
Adversarial

Cooperative

Adversarial

(0,0)

(3,-3)

Cooperative

(-3,3)

(2,2)

OEM
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The game has been predominately played with an adversarial approach because of the
optimization theory similar to that of the prisoner’s dilemma. The problem is that if both
decision-makers were purely rational, they would never cooperate. Indeed, rational decision
making means that you make the decision that is best for you regardless of what the other
actor chooses. The problem is that if both of the actors are rational, both will decide to be
adversarial, and neither will gain anything.
However, applying the principle of sub-optimization, one reaches a different
conclusion. With sub-optimization, one must consider the optimization of total system costs
as opposed to the optimization each individual sub-system (i.e., looking at the supply chain
versus OEM and suppliers). The concept is that optimizing the outcome for a subsystem in
general will not optimize the outcome for the system as a whole. This principle is also
known as the tragedy of the commons, in which shared resources are exhausted because of
competition between the actors. In the case of automotive OEMs and suppliers, there is a
limited amount of profit to be made. Each party wants to maximize its share, but the other
actors are vying for the same share in order to maximize their own utility. Currently, few
companies look at the system for optimization. Those that do (Toyota and Honda) are
benefiting from their foresight.
Another way to look at the optimization of gains is to address the game as iterative.
Year after year (sometimes sooner), the game is played again, and each party makes a
decision to be cooperative or adversarial. In this scenario, a rational actor would cooperate
as long as the other party cooperates and would switch to adversarial as soon as his/her
partner does. The basic outcome of this approach is that cooperation is more beneficial in the
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long run. Even with the discounted present value of future gains and a risk factor for the
possibility of bankruptcy, both parties will typically gain more by cooperating. The one-time
win of adversarial relations is made at the cost of future gains.
The supplier’s dilemma succinctly demonstrates what the automotive industry has
experienced without explicitly knowing the value of cooperating. One can quickly see the
benefits of choosing cooperative approaches, but this type of action is irrational according to
conventional wisdom. Despite the way the game has been played in the past, the opportunity
to optimize for the system and achieve greater benefits for all is possible.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Possible Further Research
This study has provided the empirical data necessary to substantiate the anecdotal
evidence that cooperative-trusting supplier relations do provide real economic value. The
working relationships automotive OEMs have with their suppliers do affect economic
variables that impact bottom line results and competitive advantage. The four hypotheses of
this study were validated:
1. Cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relations significantly reduce
overhead and material costs as measured by the Cost Of Goods Sold
(COGS). The differences in what OEMs spend in COGS because of their
relative relationship are on average between 2% and 10% of total COGS.
Considering that this figure can be in the tens of billions, this is a
substantial inefficiency.
2. Cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relations concurrently increase the
level of innovation and reduce OEM investments into research and
development. OEMs have identified that innovation is vital to their
competitive advantage. Ford has even stated that innovation is “the
compass by which [Ford] sets its direction” (Ford 2005)(14). If the
relationships OEMs have with suppliers affect innovation and innovation
impacts competitive advantage, then relationships should be paramount to
OEM survival.
3. Cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relationships foster quality for
individual components and overall end-product fit. Quality is a very
important characteristic in the automotive industry. Consumers are more
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knowledgeable and demanding, and their selection of products has
increased. To remain competitive, OEMs not only need to have the latest
designs, but they also must create products that will meet customer
expectations in both cost and quality. The type of working relationship an
OEM has with its suppliers substantially affects both of these product
characteristics.
4. Cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relations enhance material
management practices, reducing total inventory levels and increasing
inventory turns. The cost of capital in holding inventory for prolonged
amounts of time is undeniable. With valuable assets tied up, OEMs are
unable to invest in growth and development. Holding inventory also
affects a company’s balance sheet, which in turn has an immediate impact
on market value. If OEMs are truly attempting to lean out their
inventories and maintain high turn rates, they must consider the relative
relationships they have with their suppliers.
These results provide the foundation necessary for OEMs to make informed decisions
about the approach they take toward their working relations with suppliers. Adversarial
actions and their relative benefits can be weighed against the cost of making such a decision.
Likewise, OEMs can determine what the return on investment is likely to be for choosing
cooperative-trusting supplier relations. With this information, justification can be made for
resource allocation to create and maintain cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relations if
they are found to be rational.
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The conclusions of this study should provide direction for further investigation into
the elements of cooperative-trusting OEM-supplier relationships. With further research into
this topic, there is the possibility of identifying specific practices that could maximize the
opportunity for system-optimal economic gain. Some suggestions for future research include
the following:
1. Evaluating the economic value of suppliers’ working relationships with
regard to supplier benefits. This topic would provide the motivation for
suppliers to make investments into supporting cooperative-trusting
relationships, if that decision were rational. For this option, it may be best
to study suppliers by the products they provide, as different commodities
may experience different relative benefits.
2. Identifying and developing the hierarchy of cooperative-trusting
relationships at a greater level of granularity. Basic elements are
anecdotally known, but the marginal utility gained by each mechanism is
still unknown. Establishing the connections between mechanisms and
their marginal benefits can help OEMs and suppliers plan their
investments in a manner that will optimize the outcomes.
3. Applying the models within this study to other industries. Conceivably,
cooperative-trusting relationship approaches can benefit a variety of
industries, particularly more complex system integrations. Some
industries to look at for further application include the aerospace and
defense, shipbuilding, and industrial equipment industries.
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4. Developing a model for selecting appropriate relationship approaches for
suppliers. As indicated in this study, relationships are not one-size-fits-all.
A model for selecting relationships based on supplier characteristics may
provide OEMs a simplified approach to selecting the best mechanisms to
apply with given suppliers. Considering that OEMs can interact with
thousands of suppliers, a model could make the prospect of relationship
management more feasible.
Consider the possibilities of adopting a new approach to the way business is
conducted. Relationships are no longer intangible assets; this study provides the empirical
evidence that determines their value. Archaic adversarial practices do not have to be the
norm just because they are the only option with defined return on investment. Decisions can
be made on the basis of a comparison of alternatives rather than the taking of the only option
available. It is hoped that organizations will use this new knowledge to improve their
operations and create new levels of efficiency throughout their supply chains.
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Appendix: Variable Names and Descriptions
Variable Name

Source

Description

WRI

PPI Inc.

Working Relations Index measure of supplier relationships

ln WRI

PPI Inc.

Logarithm of Working Relations Index

sales

Compustat

Real annual sales

sales(-1)

Compustat

Real annual sales lagged by one year

ln sales

Compustat

Logarithm of real annual sales

cogs

Compustat

Real cost of goods sold

cogs(-1)

Compustat

Real cost of goods sold lagged by one year

ln cogs

Compustat

Logarithm of cost of goods sold

ln cogs(-1)

Compustat

Logarithm of cost of goods sold lagged by one year

cadence

cadence(-1)

Prudential
Equity
Group
Prudential
Equity
Group

Index of OEM innovation and new product development
Index of OEM innovation and new product development
lagged by one year

ln rd

Compustat

Logarithm of real research and development investments

inventory

Compustat

Real total inventory levels

inventory turns

Compustat

Number of inventory turns per year (number of times
inventory cycled through)
quality

JD Powers

index for overall product quality problems

ln quality

JD Powers

logarithm of index for overall product quality problems

profit(-1)

Compustat

real annual profit lagged one year
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d1

Dummy variable for the first calendar year, 2000

d2

Dummy variable for the second calendar year, 2001

d3

Dummy variable for the third calendar year, 2002

d4

Dummy variable for the fourth calendar year, 2003

df

Dummy variable for Ford specific effects

dc

Dummy variable for Chrysler specific effects

dn

Dummy variable for Nissan specific effects

dt

Dummy variable for Toyota specific effects

dh

Dummy variable for Honda specific effects
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